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The 2008 financial crisis was followed by a global 
economic downturn, credit crunch, and reduction in 
cross-border lending, trade finance, remittances, and 
foreign direct investment, which adversely affected 
businesses around the world. The consequent increase 
in the number of firm insolvencies in the financial and 
corporate sectors highlights the importance of efficient 
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bankruptcy laws. This paper summarizes the theoretical 
and empirical literature on bankruptcy design, discusses 
the challenges of introducing and implementing 
bankruptcy reforms, and presents examples of how 
policymakers are trying to use the current economic 
downturn as an opportunity to engage in meaningful 
reform of the bankruptcy process.  
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1.  Introduction 
The 2008 global financial crisis has resulted in declining demand for goods and services, 
decreasing availability of external finance, declining investments, and reductions in remittances, 
forcing firms around the world to face insolvency.  For instance, in 2009, the number of 
corporate bankruptcies in Japan was 13,306, an increase of 4.9% from 2008 (Teikoku Databank, 
2010
i); the number of corporate bankruptcies in the U.K. was 94,135, an annual increase of 
5.88% (Ministry of Justice, 2010
ii); and the number of corporate bankruptcies in Germany was 
32,687, which represents an 11% annual increase from 29,291 insolvencies in 2008, though the 
volume of debt more than doubled (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, Jahrbuch, 2009
iii). In 
the United States in 2009, 60,837 businesses declared bankruptcy, representing a 40% increase in 
filings from 2008 (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2010
iv).    
During previous financial crises in Russia, East Asia, and Argentina, attention turned to 
the importance of bankruptcy laws that supported the efficient resolution of financial distress 
(Claessens, et al., 2003).  This same shift of attention is happening today, as policymakers have 
become concerned about the effectiveness of existing bankruptcy laws, which encompasses both 
the usefulness of reorganization and liquidation laws, as well as efficiency of the judicial system 
to uphold the laws in court.   
Despite the frequency of insolvency and firm closure, the usage of legal procedures 
associated with bankruptcy vary significantly around the world, due to differences in legal 
traditions, accounting standards, regulatory frameworks, and macroeconomic factors (Claessens 
and Klapper, 2005). For instance, bankruptcies are less common in countries with concentrated 
banking systems and in firms with single banking relationships, and are more common in firms 
with more complex capital structures (Babchuck, 1988). Furthermore, the laws in some countries 3 
 
only allow for the liquidation of bankrupt firms and provide limited protection for entrepreneurs 
and managers of bankrupt firms. Other countries have more bankruptcy options (such as 
reorganization and out-of-court mediation), though the effectiveness of these laws in practice 
varies across countries (Lee, Peng and Barney, 2007). 
In a narrow context, the efficient resolution of insolvency depends on the ability to 
reorganize viable firms and to liquidate the unviable ones at low cost.  Ideally, only the best 
users of economic resources would continue as active companies, while less performing 
companies would be taken-over by more capable owners or liquidated through assets sales. In 
reality, however, there are many constraints to the efficient reallocation of capital.  Primary 
among these constraints are existing legislation.  
Since the liquidation of assets and the distribution of the raised capital among creditors is 
a collective enforcement procedure, bankruptcy law aims to solve this collective action problem. 
When a debtor becomes insolvent, creditors have incentives to engage in a “run on the bank,” 
enforcing their individual claims as quickly as possible, even if the result is a reduction in the 
overall value obtained. To prevent this scenario from occurring, bankruptcy law should provide a 
mandatory and orderly mechanism for the reallocation of insolvent assets (Jackson, 1982).  
More generally, the resolution of bankruptcy is an important example of the broad 
institutional context within which firms in specific countries operate (Peng, 2003; Scott, 1995). 
This embraces the formal as well as informal societal rules that affect entrepreneurs.  This 
includes the design of bankruptcy laws, the structure of capital markets, and the perception of 
stigmas related to personal responsibility (Lee, Peng and Barney, 2007). 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the importance of enacting strong 
bankruptcy regimes for private sector development and growth.  Section 3 reviews the impact of 4 
 
the recent financial crisis on the resolution of bankruptcy and analyzes some recent bankruptcy 
law reforms from around the world. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Features of a Well-Functioning Bankruptcy Regime 
2.1  The Importance of Bankruptcy Regime Design 
The literature suggests that firm exit is a necessary condition for economic growth: when 
innovative activity in an industry increases, firms’ overall survival rates often decrease, but those 
that do survive tend to be stronger (Audretsch, 1991; Porter, 1990; Nickell, 1996, Klapper, et al., 
2006). For instance, bankruptcy reforms in South Korea after the 1997 economic crisis 
contributed to productivity growth by allowing inefficient firms to exit, encouraging new entries 
and stimulating surviving firms to become more efficient (Lim and Hahn, 2003). In other words, 
higher competition supported by lower downside risk and lower bankruptcy cost would entice 
inefficient firms to exit (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2004).  
Lower bankruptcy costs can also stimulate inefficient firms to exit and encourage greater 
entrepreneurial activity and new firm creation.  For instance, the earlier introduction of 
bankruptcy codes in England and in the United States may have supported the more dynamic 
private sector entry and exit seen in those countries (Di Martino, 2002). To the contrary, in Italy 
and France, the commercial code introduced by Napoleon in 1807 reinforced the severity and the 
penal character of medieval legislation that discouraged firm failures (Bignon and Sgard, 2007). 
Qualitative evidence suggests that in England the devices and instruments provided by legislators 
were more effective than Italian equivalents in attracting a larger number and higher quality of 
new entrepreneurs. Furthermore, quantitative evidence shows that English procedures assured 
creditors higher dividends and shorter waiting-time than in Italy. 5 
 
In a scenario of high bankruptcy costs, inefficient firms would be reluctant to file for 
bankruptcy and would continue to operate at a financial loss (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo, 
1997). In any economy, letting some failing firms exit is essential to economic health (Ahlstrom 
and Bruton, 2004; Khanna and Poulsen, 1995), and can be beneficial for the society as a whole 
(Miller and Reuer, 1996; Venkataraman, 1997).  In Spain, firm exits actually have a positive 
impact on total industry factor productivity (Callejon and Segarra, 1999). Similar findings have 
been reported about post-1997 Asia (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2004; Carney, 2004; White, 2004).  
Previous literature also shows that well functioning bankruptcy regimes are necessary to 
ensure financial discipline in successful market economies (Smaoui and Boubakri, 2004; Nellis, 
2003). For instance, since the ease of bankruptcy determines the maximum downside risk of a 
venture, only high-risk entrepreneurs will be willing to make significant investments in start-ups 
in countries with unfriendly bankruptcy regimes. Thus, by limiting downside risks and increasing 
upside gains entrepreneurship is encouraged, leading to an increase in and the number and 
variety of people pursuing entrepreneurial activities (Lee, Peng and Barney, 2007). Indeed, data 
from a Eurobarometer survey
v show that the fear of bankruptcy is one of the most important 
reasons given by individuals for not forming their own businesses, although the extent of the 
deterrent effect varies across countries (Armour and Cumming, 2007).  
Speedier court resolutions can also reduce uncertainty for entrepreneurs, creditors, and 
management, and improve assets value and transparency.  Actions that expedite court procedures 
include minimizing dependence on the courts (through appointment of a receiver for distressed 
companies, e.g. Georgia), establishing special courts (e.g. India, Thailand, Indonesia and 
Uganda), and limiting appeals and introducing time limits (Djankov et al., 2008). 6 
 
Currently, in many countries, the existing bankruptcy regimes do not perform very well 
(Djankov et al., 2008). A survey on debt enforcement of practitioners from 88 countries indicates 
that bankruptcy procedures are time-consuming, costly and inefficient (i.e., unable to preserve 
the business as a going concern). In only 36 percent of countries, the business is preserved as a 
going concern, and an average of 48 percent of the business’ value is lost in debt enforcement. In 
a well – functioning bankruptcy system, the regime would ensure that the highest total value is 
achieved for the distressed firm.   In other words, whether the firm should be closed down, 
liquidated piecemeal, sold as a going concern, or reorganized should depend on which option 
creates the most value for its creditors and shareholders. Some portion of firm value should be 
preserved for shareholders, even in bankruptcy.  Otherwise, shareholders may do anything to 
prevent bankruptcy, including undertaking high-risk projects when the corporation is under 
distress (Hart, 2000).  Shareholders that don’t exercise caution can lead to bankruptcies with high 
administrative costs and long delays, and the sales of viable businesses.   
At the same time, ensuring the right incentive structure is critical.  During this most 
recent crisis, for example, Germany revisited its long-standing rule requiring company 
management to file for bankruptcy in certain situations, or face imprisonment.  While this rule 
was originally instituted to ensure a level of debtor discipline and creditor confidence, the 
financial crisis prompted a fear amongst some policy-makers that declining asset values would 
create widespread de facto balance-sheet insolvencies and prompt managers to put otherwise 
viable companies into insolvency proceedings.  As a result, the filing requirement was amended 
to be less stringent (see Table I). 
While there is no blueprint for optimal bankruptcy systems, there are several important 
principles that underlie the design of a good bankruptcy regime (Hart, 2000; UNCITRAL, 2005): 7 
 
-  Provide certainty in the market by ensuring a transparent and predictable insolvency law, 
while at the same time maintaining the flexibility required to allow viable companies to 
reorganize; 
-  Maximize the value of assets and preserve the insolvency estate to allow equitable 
distribution to creditors. For instance, recovery rate varies among the economies from 4.4 
cents on the dollar claimants in Philippines to 92.5 cents in Japan (World Bank, 2010); 
-  Strike a balance between liquidation and reorganization; 
-  Ensure equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors, recognize existing creditors’ rights, 
and establish clear rules for ranking priority claims; 
-  Provide for timely, efficient, and impartial resolution of insolvency. For instance, Ireland 
provides the fastest bankruptcy procedure – less than 4 months – whereas in many 
developing countries the process takes many years: Mauritania – 8 years, India – 7 years, and 
Maldives – more than 6 years (World Bank, 2010). 
Importantly, it should be noted that these principles must be considered in the context of 
the unique political structure, legal culture, and economic and social framework of each country. 
Considering the political, economic, social, and judicial differences between countries, a “one 
size fits all” approach is not wise and workable in this area of law (Gromek, Broc and Parry, 
2006) 
 
2.2  The Importance of Legal and Judicial Efficiency 
The evolution of the bankruptcy framework depends on the balance of political powers in a 
particular country, causing the bankruptcy regimes to differ significantly even among developed 
countries (Westbrook, 2002).  A study of 37 high-income and developing countries finds that 8 
 
during the 1990s, bankruptcies were higher in countries with Anglo-Saxon legal systems, greater 
judicial efficiency, market-oriented financial systems (characterized by multiple banking 
relationships), and overall greater economic development (Claessens and Klapper, 2005). These 
results confirm earlier findings that the legal environment is the main regulator of bankruptcy 
and transactions between entrepreneurs (Guislain, 1995).  
For example, an analysis of publicly listed firms that filed for bankruptcy under new 
bankruptcy laws introduced during the East Asian financial crisis finds that seeking bankruptcy 
protection is higher in countries with strong creditor rights and greater judicial efficiency 
(Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper, 2003). This study highlights the importance of establishing a 
balance between protection of creditors’ rights (such as the sale of assets in the case of default), 
which is essential for firms’ access to finance, and identification and reorganization of viable 
enterprises.   
Differences between debtor-friendly regimes and creditor-friendly regimes also influence 
a firm’s decision to use in or out-of-court reorganizations.  In this regard, distressed firms are 
more likely to use in-court reorganizations in debtor-friendly regimes (White, 1993). A study of 
169 financially distressed firms finds that firms that settle out-of-court have more intangible 
assets, a larger percentage of debt owed to banks, and fewer lenders (Gilson et al., 1990). On the 
other hand, an earlier study shows that firms that resolve financial distress out-of-court are more 
likely to remain highly leveraged and are more prone to experience further financial distress 
(Gilson, 1997).  Bankruptcy laws might also affect the ex-ante behavior of firm managers and 
owners in operating and financing the firm (La Porta et al., 1997). Debtor friendly laws might 
encourage managers to seek bankruptcy protection from their creditors at an earlier point, which 
may increase the likelihood of the firm’s survival and may ultimately benefit its claimants. Such 9 
 
laws, however, also allow incompetent managers to keep their jobs. Therefore, the bankruptcy 
regime should encourage the behavioral incentives that require that all responsible parties incur 
some costs for the firms’ poor performance.  These costs usually take the form of a reduction in 
creditors’ claims value or negative consequences for the managers. 
These disincentives become extremely important in preventing imprudent investments, 
enhancing contractibility, and distributing loans with too high probability of default (Rajan and 
Zingales 1995, White 1993). However, when the personal costs are too high they discourage 
public bankruptcy filings in favor of private negotiations. For instance, studies of distressed 
firms in the United States (Gilson 1989, Gilson and Vetsuypens 1994) find that after a 
bankruptcy filing managers receive significantly lower salaries and bonuses (on average, 
managers receive only 35% of their previous gross income), and more than half of the sampled 
managers are fired. Since new management may be unfamiliar with the company and unable to 
ensure a smooth transition, the creditors will suffer higher costs of resolution during distress.   
In addition to reputational and financial losses, entrepreneurs and managers suffer 
psychological costs—referred to as stigma— when filing for bankruptcy (Shepherd, 2003). 
Individuals from different countries are likely to differ in the level of stigma they experience 
upon bankruptcy (Hofstede, 1980).   For instance, in a study of eight countries, individuals that 
reported an aversion to ‘uncertainty’ were significantly less likely to be business owners, 
presumably because of fear of failure (McGrath, MacMillan, and Scheinberg, 1992). 
The importance of efficient bankruptcy laws is highlighted by evidence showing that 
creditors and debtors change their behaviors when there are improvements in bankruptcy 
procedures, such as laws dictating each side’s rights in resolving disputes stemming from 
contract violation.  In the absence of bankruptcy law, even when coordinated liquidation would 10 
 
maximize the returns to the creditors as a group, each creditor has an incentive to collect the debt 
privately before other creditors. Because the firm’s assets are sold in an ad hoc approach, the 
resulting first-come, first-served ordering of creditors’ claims will prompt an inefficient 
liquidation (Longhofer and Peters, 2004).   
To the contrary, efficient bankruptcy laws give order to the sales and distribution of 
assets of insolvent firms and can positively affect loan terms (such as spreads, rates, and 
collateral requirements), leverage ratios, and bank recovery rates (Davydenko and Franks, 2008; 
Acharya, et al., 2008).  For instance, the introduction of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India 
reduced delinquency in loan repayment rates by between 3 and 11 percent and interest rates fell 
by up to 2 percentage points (Visaria, 2006).    
 
2.3  Additional Challenges for Insolvent Firms 
2.3.1  In Middle-income Countries 
As they are undertaking reform to ‘catch-up’ their insolvency systems with international best 
practice, middle-income countries will also have to consider addressing some of the emerging 
issues facing developed countries in insolvency reform.  Specifically, issues such as the 
treatment of corporate groups (where an enterprise consists of two or more legal entities), which 
even the most advanced insolvency laws do not contemplate (Uttamchandani, 2008) and the 
treatment of insolvencies that span two or more jurisdictions, thereby creating complex issues of 
asset recovery, jurisdiction and regulatory oversight (Uttamchandani, 2008).  While these issues 
may be overly complex for small undeveloped economies, India, China, Turkey, and other 
middle-income countries wrestling with basic questions, may also have to tackle these more 
challenging ones at the same time.   11 
 
In particular, given the dramatic increase in foreign direct investment in these countries 
over the past few years, large insolvencies will increasingly have transnational dimensions.  This 
will put the countries’ insolvency systems into direct contact with systems from advanced 
countries, necessitating clear rules of engagement.  In Europe, for example, the Parmalat case 
underscored the need for courts in multiple jurisdictions to coordinate efforts in winding up an 
insolvent estate and for insolvency administrators appointed in one jurisdiction to have clear 
guidelines under which they could seek recognition from local courts in other jurisdictions.   
Because of the increased integration that some middle-income countries have achieved with the 
global economy, they will no longer have the luxury of limiting their insolvency regimes to 
purely domestic considerations. 
 
2.3.2  In Labor-Intensive Firms 
There has been little empirical work addressing the specific challenges of labor intensive firms in 
the bankruptcy process, despite the growing importance of service-oriented firms. For instance, 
how does the relationship between a firm and its employees affect the choices made by an 
insolvent firm? Indeed, bankrupt firms routinely cite employee retention as a critical concern 
(Berk et al., 2010; Berkovitch et al., 1997). 
The literature suggests that the process of corporate bankruptcy varies by labor intensity 
(Wang, 2009).  First, labor intensive firms increase their leverage more sharply prior to 
bankruptcy compared with capital intensive firms, relying on borrowing to finance firm growth 
instead of undertaking typical restructuring activities. In conjunction with their increased 
borrowing, labor intensive firms postpone bankruptcy longer after initial cash flow shortfalls, but 12 
 
file more quickly after suffering shocks to fundamentals (such as declines in sales and revenues). 
Second, labor intensive firms are more likely to be liquidated during the bankruptcy process. 
 
2.3.3  In Small and Medium- sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
Most literature considers the importance of bankruptcy codes to address the needs of creditors 
that lend to large, capital intensive firms.  However, good bankruptcy systems can also be 
important for smaller and labor intensive service firms.  For instance, 80 percent of U.S. firms 
that filed for bankruptcy reported assets under $1 million, and 88 percent reported having fewer 
than 20 employees (Warren and Westbrook, 1999).   In additions, SME’s are especially 
vulnerable to macroeconomic and financial shocks; for example, SME insolvencies in Denmark, 
Italy, Spain, and Ireland exceeded 25 percent between 2007 and 2008 (OECD, 2009). 
However, despite the importance and the complexity of small business as a contributor to 
the economy, there has been little academic research on the effect of bankruptcy legislation on 
SMEs.  In many jurisdictions, different bankruptcy procedures are available for corporate and 
individual debtors, or distinguish between debtors who are ‘traders’ (individual or corporate) or 
consumers (Armour and Cumming, 2007). 
Lenders to small businesses often require that the owner provide a personal guarantee to 
the loan, such as a second mortgage on his house (Berkowitz and White, 2004; Djankov et al., 
2002). Guarantees of this sort put the personal assets of the firm’s owner on the line and blur the 
distinction between the assets of the firm and those of the owner; in other words, the limited-
liability of the firm no longer applies to this particular loan.  In addition, personal bankruptcy 
laws would apply to this firm in the case of default.  A survey of a sample of individuals from 
the United States who filed for bankruptcy during the 1980s estimates that around 20% had debts 13 
 
from a failed business (Sullivan, et al., 1989).  While the personal guarantee of a firm’s owner 
might encourage a level of financial discipline, in countries without a personal bankruptcy 
framework, a single business failure could doom an owner to a lifetime of outstanding debt 
(Uttamchandani and Menezes, 2010) and effectively prevent them from re-entering the market as 
seasoned entrepreneurs (Armour and Cumming, 2005). 
 
3.  Bankruptcy Regimes during the Crisis 
3.1  Bankruptcy Regime as One of the Main Tools for Entrepreneurship Recovery 
The 2008 global financial crisis is causing a sharp increase in bankruptcies around the world.  
Ensuring that viable companies can continue to operate as going concerns and preserving jobs 
has become especially important.  In response, policymakers are debating whether existing 
bankruptcy regimes adequately address current business’ demands.  
Ineffective procedures for dealing with bankruptcy can deepen and prolong a crisis. Low 
demand may make firms reluctant to restructure and regain their health, affecting the health of 
the banking sector and further restricting credit to firms that may be recovering.  Distress among 
financial institutions can also reduce the incentives for firms to repay their loans.  The 
bankruptcy processes – which are generally already under strain during normal times – can be 
completely overwhelmed (Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009). 
During 2009, the number of corporate bankruptcies in Japan was 13,306 (up 4.9% from 
12,681 in 2008, Teikoku Databank, 2010
vi), in Great Britain 94,135 (5.88% growth compare to 
2008, Ministry of Justice, 2010
vii), and in Germany, the number of corporate bankruptcies was 
32,687, which represents 11% annual increase, whereas the volume of debt more than doubled 
(Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, Jahrbuch, 2009
viii). In 2009, 60,837 businesses in the 14 
 
United States declared bankruptcy, representing a 40% increase in filings from 2008 (American 
Bankruptcy Institute, 2010
ix).  
The World Bank’s Financial Crisis Survey shows that in the EU, the use of bankruptcy 
procedures was less frequent than the use of state aid and debt restructuring. On average, 8.3 
percent of European firms applied for state aid in the previous 12 months (as of June – July 
2009), whereas, only 2 percent of all surveyed companies filed for bankruptcy. When 
considering only the subsample of firms with overdue payments, the proportion of firms that 
filed for bankruptcy increased to almost 6 percent, with the highest percent in Hungary (9.9%) 
(Correa and Iootty, 2010).   
In light of widespread financial distress, many researchers have expressed concern that 
the costs of direct intervention of governments, such as giving assistance to individual 
companies, comes at a significant fiscal obligation to taxpayers.  In addition, it prevents 
meaningful restructuring, encourages the private sector to expect similar assistance, gives 
incentive for imprudent risk-taking incentives, and paves the way for more frequent and costlier 
crises in the future (Caprio et al., 2008; Demirguc-Kunt and Serven, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
2008).  
Encouraging bankruptcy reform could also be effective to encourage new 
entrepreneurship during a financial crisis. Policymakers drew an important lesson from the 1997 
East Asia Financial Crisis in which several countries began reconsidering their corporate 
bankruptcy laws when existing bankruptcy systems did not allow the corporate sector to 
rehabilitate during long term economic recession (Armour and Deakin, 2001). When illiquidity 
spread across the region, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand were forced to modify their laws 
to favor the rehabilitation of distressed firms, as an alternative to liquidations (Carruthers and 15 
 
Halliday, 2007). Indonesia and Thailand also introduced specialized courts to implement 
bankruptcy procedures. 
Prior to the reform, Thai judicial procedure was fraught with large transactions costs: 
Bankruptcy cases dragged on for more than two years on average, and there was no specialized 
court to implement expedited procedures. The law lacked provisions for debtors in possession 
financing and an automatic stay to protect assets. The law also did not explain how creditors and 
managers should prepare and implement a restructuring plan.  As a result of reforms in Thailand, 
both creditors and debtors experienced immediate financial gains from the new bankruptcy 
procedures (Foley, 1999). 
Many other examples suggest that by restructuring viable businesses and quickly 
liquidating nonviable ones, well-functioning bankruptcy regimes can reallocate and remobilize 
resources, thus speeding up the recovery from the crisis. For instance, according to Bergoeing et 
al., 2007, Chile’s bankruptcy reform was the main reason for its relatively quick recovery from a 
deep recession in the early 1980s. Gine and Love (2008) came to the same conclusion regarding 
Colombia’s bankruptcy reform in 1999, which began in the middle of the financial crisis that 
spread across Latin America.  They show that the reform significantly improved the efficiency of 
the bankruptcy process by streamlining reorganization proceedings. 
Even among countries that have existing bankruptcy laws, additional mechanisms might 
be created in the times of global or regional economic downturn. For example, the Mexican and 
East Asian crises spurred the introduction of the “London rules” or, “prepackaged” bankruptcies, 
which encourage all creditors to sign out-of-court agreements reached among the majority of 
creditors prior to the bankruptcy filing, and which sometimes include formal arbitration rules, 
making it possible for an out-of-court system to circumvent formal judicial process and its 16 
 
attendant costs (Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009). Lately this instrument has been used by many countries.  
For instance, Italy now allows distressed companies to seek an agreement with creditors before 
filing for bankruptcy, which permits the companies to continue operating. 
Miller and Stiglitz 1999 and Stiglitz 2002 proposed the use of “super-bankruptcy” to 
enhance recovery and provide protection against large macroeconomic shocks. By keeping 
existing management in place and forcing debt-to-equity conversions, the super-bankruptcy 
mechanism aims to prevent liquidations that occurs as a result of a system-wide crisis and does 
not punish existing managers who become victims of external macroeconomic shocks.  The 
downside of such a policy is the moral hazard of protecting firm managers and owners (who 
caused the problems in the first place) and the incentive it gives to creditors to charge higher 
interest rates in normal times because their loan is at risk (Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009).  Evidence 
from the East Asian crisis suggests that adopting super-bankruptcy was inefficient; there were 
not too many liquidations as a result of the crises, and, if anything, too many unviable firms were 
allowed to continue their operations for too long (Claessens et al., 2005). For instance, in France, 
giving priority to creditors lending money to distressed companies over previous secured 
creditors (“super priority”) made it easier for such companies to obtain new loans and continue 
operating (Hart, 2000).  
 
3.2  Reforming Bankruptcy around the World 
During normal times, proposed reforms to bankruptcy laws might face opposition from lobbies 
of judges, administrators and lawyers poised to derail change (Djankov, 2009).   However, 
during financial crises, policymakers might be forced to addresses weaknesses in their 17 
 
insolvency codes in response to an increase in loan defaults and business closures.  Table 1 
summarizes a number of recent reforms introduced following the 2008 financial crisis:  
 
Table 1.  Examples of Bankruptcy Reforms, 2008-2010 
Country Year  Reforms  Objective/Outcome 
Bolivia  2008  Bolivia made the bankruptcy process more complex 
by suspending applications for voluntary 
restructuring. The only remaining option is a 
bankruptcy procedure that typically takes many years. 
The reform was intended to prevent viable businesses 
that were hit by the financial crisis from exiting the 
market (World Bank, 2009).  
The reform worsened the situation for 
distressed firms wishing to seek resolution. 
Many companies, which would have 
otherwise been able to recover, were forced in 





2009  The new Insolvency Act introduced reorganization as 
the preferred method for resolving insolvency, 
established an electronic insolvency register and set 
new qualification standards for trustees. (Osicka, T., 
Kucerova, I., Mestanek, P., 2008) 
According to a 2009 EBRD assessment, the 
Czech Republic’s insolvency system, in 
contrast to previous evaluations, was deemed 
as “highly compliant” with current 
international standards. The assessment noted 
that new law positively affected the areas of 
assets of the estate, creditor rights, and 
reorganization (EBRD,2009a).  
Estonia 
 
2008 In  December  2008,  Estonia enacted a new 
Restructuring Act, which, is modeled on the U.S. 
Chapter 11 approach, as well as on the German 
Insolvenzordnung and the Finnish Saneerauslaki. The 
new Act is intended to help financially troubled firms 
avoid liquidation and optimize the possibility of 
retaining their reputation and the trust of their 
creditors. The act enabled distressed companies on the 
verge of insolvency to reorganize themselves, 
restructure their debt, and apply other measures to 
regain financial health and restore profitability. 
Control of the troubled firm remains in the hands of 
the management and late-pay penalties, as well as 
other court-centered activities, are halted (EStandards 
Forum, 2010). 
According to Sorainen, 2009, creditors may 
find the new Act attractive because it offers 
them a clear non-bankruptcy means of 
maximizing the amount they are able to 
collect from a debtor. The new 
reorganizations regime may prove attractive to 
investors, who would be interested in 
purchasing debt or equity in financially 
distressed firms (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2010). 
Following the reform, bankruptcy costs in 
Estonia are an average of 9% of the estate, 
compared to a regional cost of 13.4%. The 
average recovery rate is 37.5 cents on the 
dollar in Estonia, compared to an average of 
28.3 cents in the region (World Bank, 2009). 
France 
 
2008  The reform improved the insolvency process by 
encouraging pre-insolvency workouts and by ending 
the requirement for estimation of the value of assets 
by a public auctioneer.( World Bank, 2009) 
The new legislation has as its main purpose to 
promote restructuring rather than bankruptcy 
proceedings (Lucheux, J-M., Pusch, O., 2009). 
Germany  2009-
2010 
Germany enacted temporary relief during the financial 
crisis, which will be effective only until December 31, 
2010. It eliminated its law requiring managers of 
potentially viable companies to file for bankruptcy in 
case of overindebtedness, where business survival is 
more likely than in the case of illiquidity. The current 
law allows these companies to continue to operate.  
Moreover, in July 2010, the German Federal Ministry 
of Justice issued an internal draft bill of the Act to 
Facilitate Further the Restructuring of Companies, 
A recent study finds that the fallout from the 
financial and economic crisis caused more 
than 34 percent of the bankruptcy applications 
filed in 2009; it is expected that insolvencies 
will  reach a new record in 2010 (Wirtschaft 
Konkret, 2010). 18 
 
which would result in significant amendments to the 
German Insolvency Code and thereby facilitate the in-
court restructuring of German companies.  The draft 
bill has met with broad political support and highly 
positive feedback in the market, making it likely that 
it will become law within the next few months (Meier, 
W., Kern, M., Schauenburg, C., 2010). 
Italy  2005-
2008 
The amendments to the Bankruptcy Law, Royal 
Decree No 267 of 1942, aimed to introduce efficient 
pre-bankruptcy procedures, an automatic stay period 
of 60 days, and the possibility of paying secured 
creditors less than the full amount of debt. At the 
beginning of the crisis, in October 2008, the Law 
No.166 allowed the insolvency procedure to be 
extended to companies within the corporate group of 
the debtor parent entity, as well as those who provide 
services to the debtor on an exclusive basis. Alongside 
this, the amendments enable debtors to pursue 
immediate asset disposal plans. (EStandards Forum, 
Insolvency Framework, Italy, 2010) 
The main goal of the reform was the 
simplification of business restructurings.   
Prior to the reform, insolvency procedures 
were predominantly aimed at liquidating 
insolvent enterprises (Novarese, 2009). 
Kuwait 
 
2009  Reform enabled restructuring of companies facing 
financial difficulty or insolvency. The assets of any 
local companies declared bankrupt will be valued 
based on current market values, with priority on any 
profits designated to repaying government loans. Any 
assets left after repayment of the loans should go to 
company shareholders, followed by companies and 
individual creditors who have an equal claim. (World 
Bank, 2010) 
The Hawkamah-World Bank-OECD survey, 
based on the Principles and Guidelines for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights 
Systems developed by the World Bank, scored 
nations according to a 155 point system, with 
higher scores denoting stronger insolvency 
regimes. Kuwait achieved a score of 104 out 
of 155, which is below the OECD average of 
124, but above the MENA average of 88. 
(Saidi, N., 2009) 
Lithuania 
  
2008  The reform shortens time limits on bankruptcy 
procedures by eliminating the minimal term of 3 
months, which must be passed in order for the 
creditors to apply to a court. The reform also aims to 
secure the interests of the creditors, i.e. to transfer 
control of the company to the administrator in order to 
prevent directors or owners from unfairly selling or 
hiding the assets of the bankrupted company.  This 
transfer also establishes higher standards of 
responsibility for the persons executing the 
procedures of the bankruptcies. (World Bank, 2009) 
Currently in Lithuania, it takes an average of 
1.5 years to complete a bankruptcy proceeding 
(in contrast to 1.7 prior to the reform), 
whereas the average time for the region is 3.1 
years and the time required in OECD states 
averages 1.7 years. It costs an average of 7% 
of the estate in Lithuania, compared to an 
average regional cost of 13.4% and an OECD 
average of 8.4%. (EStandards Forum, 
Insolvency Framework, Lithuania, 2010) 
Malawi  2009  The new Companies Regulation that took effect in 
June 2009 has made the mechanism for payment of 
liquidators more transparent. The new regulation sets 
a cap on the liquidator’s fees: 5% of the value of the 
estate. Before, liquidators had the discretion to set 
their own fees, usually at around 10% of the value of 
the estate.  
Malawi is also undertaking a comprehensive overhaul 
of its insolvency and secured transactions laws, 
expected to be completed in 2011. (World Bank, 
2010) 
According to the 2010 Doing Business 
Report, Malawi became the top reformer in 
closing business procedures. The reduction of 
the bankruptcy costs and strengthening of 
creditors rights were two main goals of the 
reform. As a result, of the reform, the overall 
cost of the insolvency procedure in Malawi 
fell from 30% of the value of the estate to 
25%. Moreover, the secured creditors, rank-
ordered based upon investment registration 




Middle East   2009- 
2010 
The crisis forced 11 MENA jurisdictions to establish 
dialog in order to reinforce the bankruptcy regime in 
the region. In May 2009, in Abu Dhabi, 
representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab 
Emirates and West Bank and Gaza signed a joint 
declaration on intended reform in the region.
  (the 
“Abu Dhabi Declaration”) as part of a WorldBank/ 
OECD/ INSOL International/ Hawkamah sponsored 
Forum on Insolvency Reform in MENA (FIRM). 
Countries agreed to set up public-private partnerships 
to strengthen and unify their bankruptcy regimes. The 
insolvency laws in operation within the Dubai 
International Financial Centre have been proposed as 
a basis for the unification, as it offers cost-effective, 
efficient and timely mechanisms for dealing with 
insolvency and creditor/debtor rights issues (Saudi 
Gazette, 2010).  
Reform of bankruptcy and creditor rights is 
aimed at improving economic efficiencies and 
strengthening market resilience in times of 
crisis (Saudi Gazette, 2010). 
Poland 
 
2008  Poland amended its bankruptcy law to permit the 
option of reorganization prior to bankruptcy by 
introducing prepackaged reorganizations and 
regulating the receiver profession. (World Bank, 
2010). Also the U.S. Department of Commerce's 2009 
Country Commercial Guide to Poland stated that the 
courts are generally slow, but that reforms to the 
insolvency regime are ongoing. It noted that the new 
Bankruptcy Law permits filings by either the troubled 
firm's board of directors or by creditors (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2010) 
Poland was among the Eastern European and 
Central Asian countries that led the world in 
insolvency and credit reforms. As a result, the 
average costs of bankruptcy procedures 
dropped 2% and the recovery rate grew for 
2%. (World Bank, 2009). 
Romania  2008  As a result of the rising number of insolvency cases, 
the government increased the cost of the liquidation 
procedures attempting to stop falling market (The 
Diplomat, 2010). A November 2008 amendment to its 
insolvency law requires 1.5% of the amount recovered 
from each insolvency procedure to go to a fund for 
reimbursing the expenses of insolvency 
administrators. The aim was to ensure that insolvency 
administrators are paid even when debtors have no 
assets, but the reform put additional constrains on 
closing businesses. (World Bank, 2010) 
The number of insolvencies rose by 25% in 
2009 compared to 2008. A collapse in sales, 
mostly in the residential market, forced 3,600 
real estate and construction companies to enter 
into insolvency. The reform reduced the 
amount creditors recover in cases where the 
company has assets and increases inefficiency 
in cases where few or no assets are available 
(The Diplomat, 2010). 
Russia  2008-
2009 
Russia's insolvency regime has undergone significant 
reform in 2008-09. The reform introduced a set of 
professional requirements for administrators. 
Moreover, the enforcement issues have been 
addressed with the introduction of a non-judicial 
procedure for foreclosures, aimed at simplifying and 
expediting the process. (EBRD, 2009b) 
The 2010 EBRD report discloses that 
legislative changes were expected to result in 
substantial improvement in the position of 
secured creditors. (EBRD, 2010) 
The costs of a bankruptcy proceeding are of 9 
% of the estate in Russia, compared to an 




2010  The changes to the law “On Bankruptcy” reduced 
statutory time limits and the costs of proceedings. 
(USAID, 2009) 
The reform is expected to reduce the time 
required for closing a business from three to 
two 2 years, decrease the cost of bankruptcy 
from 9% to 2% of total asset values, and 
increase the ratio of funds recovered for 
investors from 25.4 cents to 35 cents per U.S. 





2008  The new bankruptcy law No. 18.387 consolidated all 
the different procedures existing prior to the 
enactment of the new law in just one unique 
procedure called "Concurso".  This procedure is 
applicable for all natural or legal persons but not for 
final consumers (Garcia, 2008). Further, the 
"Concurso" may result in: (1) the agreement between 
the debtor and the creditor; (2) the liquidation of the 
firm as a unity; and (3) the liquidation of the firm into 
parts. The new Bankruptcy Law aims to encourage 
companies to disclose financial difficulties in a 
promptly manner, to simplify the access to new 
insolvency procedures, to facilitate the agreement 
between debtors and creditors, and to preserve the 
viable firms (Garcia, 2008). 
In Uruguay, it takes an average of 2.1 years to 
complete a bankruptcy proceeding, whereas 
the average time for the region is 3.3 years. It 
costs an average of 7% of the estate in 
Uruguay, compared to an average regional 
cost of 15.9% and an OECD average of 8.4%. 
The average recovery rate is 43 cents on the 
dollar in Uruguay, compared to an average of 
26.8 cents in the region. (World Bank, 2009) 
  
 
As the main goals of the reforms enacted in times of crisis are to improve economic 
efficiencies and strengthen market resilience, the most popular trends among the reformers 
currently include:  
-  Establishing reorganization procedures or pre-packaged arrangements (e.g., Italy, 
Kuwait, Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Mauritius, Uruguay, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Philippines, and France).  In comparison, Bolivia suspended accepting applications for voluntary 
restructuring. While this reform was aimed at preventing viable businesses from exiting the 
market, the result was that many distressed companies that otherwise might have been able to 
recover were forced into a long liquidation process. 
-  Introduction of shorter time limits on bankruptcy procedures (Lithuania, Tajikistan).  
For instance, the Republic of Tajikistan introduced a new bankruptcy law which streamlined the 
bankruptcy process and reduced the time required for closing a business from three years to two. 
In Lithuania, reforms to commercial bankruptcy laws reduced the three-month wait-period for 
creditors to initiate bankruptcy proceedings to a thirty-day grace period; during the first half-year 
of 2009, bankruptcy procedures were initiated for 936 enterprises, which is 55 percent more than 
at the same time in 2008.
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-  Introducing professional requirements for bankruptcy administrators (Russia, Albania, 
and Columbia).  These administrators play essential roles in insolvency procedures, by taking 
part in managing insolvent companies and selling the assets of nonviable ones. For example, 
Colombia, Russia, and Albania introduced licensing requirements for bankruptcy receivers and 
training courses to improve professional qualification standards.   
These examples show that many governments recognize the importance of bankruptcy 
reform to preserve businesses as going concerns for as long as possible, as well as to strengthen 
creditors rights and improve the overall investment climate.  However, much more work must be 
carried out in order for most countries to comply with international best practices that underlie 
the design of good bankruptcy laws. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
The 2008 global economic downturn, credit crunch, and reduction in cross-border 
lending, trade finance, remittances and foreign direct investment, has adversely affected 
businesses around the world.  The significant increase in the number of insolvent firms in the 
financial and corporate sectors highlights the importance of improving bankruptcy regimes.   It is 
critical to examine and draw lessons from previous reforms as governments and policymakers 
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